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Abstract. In previous work, we have argued that a sophisticated cognitive system 
with a complex body must possess configurable models of itself (or at least its 
body) and the world, along with the necessary infrastructure to use the modelled 
interactions between these two components to select relatively advantageous 
actions. These models may be used to generate representations of the future 
(imagination) and the past (episodic memory). In this paper we will explore some 
problems surrounding the representation of the present arising from the use of such 
models in the artificial cognitive system under development within the 
ECCEROBOT project. There are two aspects to consider: the representation of the 
state of the robot’s body within the self model, and the representation of the state 
of the external world within the world model. In both natural and robotic systems, 
the processing of the sensory data carrying state information takes a considerable 
time, and so any estimates of the present states of both the agent and the world 
would have to be obtained by using predictive models. However, it appears that 
there is no need for any such representations to be generated in the course of 
selecting a course of action using self and world models, since representations are 
only of the future or the past. This may call into question the utility and timing of 
the apparent perception of the present in humans. 
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1. Introduction 
In previous work, we have argued from first principles that a sophisticated cognitive 
system with a complex body must possess configurable models of itself (or at least its 
body) and of the world, along with the necessary infrastructure to use the modelled 
interactions between these two components to select relatively advantageous actions. 
We have reviewed the biological and psychological evidence supporting the view that 
humans possess and use such an architecture, and we have successfully demonstrated 
such a scheme – essentially a kind of imagination, which we call functional embodied 
imagination – on a complex robot [1,2]. We have since taken note of the recently 
established connections between imagination and episodic memory in humans in order 
to consider the possible extension of our scheme to providing a kind of episodic 
memory for the system’s actions [3].  
As noted in [4], many authors have pointed out that the possession and use of a 
self-model may ultimately lead to consciousness, or at least to many of the cognitive 
features that seem to be associated with consciousness. There are many pitfalls in 
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attempting to deal directly with the notion of consciousness in artefacts, but these can 
be avoided by adopting the representational principle of experience proposed in [3]. 
This makes the very simple assumption that whatever is (consciously) experienced in a 
system must be represented, but that mere representation does not necessarily imply 
experience. By analysing cognitive architectures for what needs to be represented for 
purely functional reasons, this places a useful constraint on what might be experienced 
within such systems. In our own architecture, we have so far dealt with what we call 
functional embodied imagination and (to some extent) episodic memory. Although 
imagination in general deals with counterfactuals, functional embodied imagination – a 
way of deciding what to do next – is about the future; in contrast, episodic memory is 
always about the past. For completeness, in this paper we will explore the issues 
surrounding the representation of the present, and we will use the version of our 
architecture under development within the ECCEROBOT project [5]. 
But what kinds of issues might arise in the representation of the present? There are 
many possibilities, and we will consider only a small subset here. We will be 
concerned only with the representation within the system at a time T of the state of the 
robot and the external world at time T. We will not be concerned with the 
representation of time itself within the system, which may not be intrinsically temporal, 
nor with anything corresponding to the subjective experience of time. Instead, our 
focus will be on the function and nature of the state representation. Its function, defined 
very narrowly, will be assessed in relation to its contribution to the selection of 
relatively beneficial actions through the mechanism of internal simulation. The nature 
of the representation is constrained by the unavoidable existence of delays in both 
sensing and sensory processing: if any representation of the present exists, it must 
necessarily be a representation of the predicted present based on data from the past. 
This was first articulated in the context of visual perception by Helmholtz [6], who 
measured the surprisingly low speed of neural conduction, and who then invoked 
‘unconscious inference’ as the mediating process in producing a timely perception, a 
position developed much further and much later by Richard Gregory. (Our use of the 
phrase ‘predicted present’ is partly to differentiate it from Edelman’s ‘remembered 
present’[7], which applies to subjective experience; nevertheless, both use data from 
the past.) 
2. ECCEROBOT: Body, sensors, actuators, control, and cognition 
The European project ECCEROBOT (Embodied Cognition in a Compliantly 
Engineered Robot) [5] is exploring the possible connections between a specifically 
human embodiment, and specifically human cognitive characteristics. It centres around 
a series of robots each of which copies the musculoskeletal structure of the human 
body, with a human-like skeletal torso, and analogues of muscles elastically coupled to 
the bones via elastic tendons. Figure1(a) shows a recent example, the ECCEROBOT 
Design Study (EDS). This anthropomimetic approach [8] contrasts with that of 
conventional humanoid robots, which, although they fit within a roughly human 
envelope, are constructed using the same technology as industrial robots, with stiff, 
precisely controlled motors and joints. There are four key characteristics which 
distinguish anthropomimetic robots like ECCEROBOT from traditional humanoids: 
tendon-driven redundant actuation, multi-articular joint actuators, compliance, and 
complex joints (see [9] for details). While these succeed in producing a distinctively 
human (or animal) embodiment, they also make it almost impossible to use the 
standard engineering control techniques which conventional humanoids are so carefully 
designed to facilitate. It is for this reason that a key part of the ECCEROBOT project is 
to investigate how such robots might be controlled – and of course, the control 
methodology will necessarily both constrain and enable the possibilities for cognition. 
 
  
Figure 1. (a) An anthropomimetic robot, the ECCEROBOT Design Study (EDS). (b) 3D Static structure 
captured in Blender model.  (c) Dynamic behaviour modelled in the Bullet physics engine. 
In an ideal world, the controller of choice would be a biologically inspired neural 
system. However, it is still the case that not enough is known about the mechanisms of 
muscular control to make this a practicable proposition for such a complex robot, with 
its 44 motors, 70 jointed components, and almost 100 degrees of freedom. (Note that 
the robot is underactuated, with many degrees of freedom under passive control.) 
Instead, we are investigating three different but possibly complementary methods: 
classical engineering control, sensory-motor strategies, and functional embodied 
imagination. We have made some progress with the first [10], but its limitations have 
now become clear. Work on the second, which will combine the principles of 
embodiment and self-organisation set out in [11] with sophisticated information based 
metrics to characterise sensory-motor interactions, is just beginning. The rest of this 
paper deals with the implementation of functional imagination and its likely cognitive 
consequences.  
In order to act appropriately, the control system needs information about the 
robot’s state, the state of the environment, and the relation between the robot and the 
environment. Ideally, all of this information would be derived from sensors mounted 
on the robot, and those sensors and their associated processing architectures would be 
biologically inspired. We have satisfied the first requirement – there are no offboard 
sensors – but the severe constraints of the physical embodiment, as well as our 
substantial ignorance about how the nervous system processes sensory information, 
have led us to adopt a more pragmatic approach to the second.  
The key provider of information about the environment is vision. After initial 
investigations using a single camera (hence the single eye of the EDS), which is known 
to be capable of providing all the required information [12], we have adopted the 
Microsoft Kinect [13] as the main visual sensor. The Kinect provides a depth map co-
registered with an RGB image; these data are processed using GPU accelerated 
techniques to produce a simplified texture mapped depth map in from tens to hundreds 
of milliseconds [14]. Within this map, known objects can be recognised and localised, 
and can then be replaced with detailed precompiled physically and cosmetically correct 
models as described below. The position of the robot’s head in relation to the 
environment is known from the Kinect data; the static and dynamic configuration of the 
rest of the body is derived from a knowledge of the positions of the motors, the lengths 
of the muscle/tendon units, the motor currents, and the tensions in the tendons. All 
sensory and motor data are managed by a distributed control architecture [15].  
3. Delays, and how to deal with them 
3.1. Motor Planning 
The motor planning strategy for ECCEROBOT’s compliant, complex and non-linear 
structure takes as its premise the assumption that, in our present state of knowledge, it 
is unlikely that either an adequate analytical model or a suitable control signal could be 
designed. We have therefore taken the approach of using a generic physics engine to 
build a detailed simulation model of the robot's structure and joints, including models 
of the passively compliant tendons, the motors and gearboxes. By stepping the physics 
model forward in time under the influence of simulated motor inputs we can then use it 
as a forward model supporting search or learning strategies in kinodynamic space to 
attempt to obtain a sequence of open loop motor inputs taking the model from a given 
starting state (the captured state of the robot and environment) to a target state (e.g. 
grasping an object). This sequence would then be downloaded to the real robot for 
execution. 
3.2. Delay Compensating Control Architecture for ECCEROBOT 
As with any control system, delays must be taken into account. The most important 
delay is the end to end delay between the state of the system at a given time, and the 
earliest time that a control output based on the sensing of that state can begin to act. 
The total end to end delay is therefore din + dout  where din is the time to capture, 
transmit and process sensor readings to obtain the relevant state estimate, and  dout is the 
time taken to generate a new (or revised) motor activation plan plus the time to transmit 
this to the physical motors. Thus, if S(t) is the robot state at time t, then the motor 
planner must be initialized with the state S( t + din + dout  ) as this is the earliest state of 
the system where any new motor plan can have any physical effect on its motion. Of 
course, during din and dout the robot will continue to be moved under the existing motor 
plan, and so din must include not only the time for computing S(t) from the sensor data 
but also the time dpredict for rolling this state estimate forward to S( t + din + dout  ). The 
output side of the delay-compensation control architecture is summarized in the 
schematic Figure 2, in which for convenience (din + dout) is written as d. 
 
Figure 2. Output delay compensation control architecture for ECCEROBOT. 
The current proposed motor plan to reach the goal state is quantized and queued 
into the motor timeline cache. Control signals are sent to the robot motors continuously, 
read from this single master queue. The model of the robot and its elastic actuators 
takes the estimated current state S and drives it with the current motor plan, obtained by 
reading out the set of upcoming signal sequences covering the period d from the 
timeline cache.  A predicted future state S(t+d) can thus be obtained. The motor 
planner now locates a new best plan that will take the robot from S(t+d) to the goal 
state. Revised plans are loaded into the queue, overwriting the old values but starting 
from the time step at t + d. 
3.3. Modelling an ECCEROBOT 
To create a sufficiently fast non-linear, dynamic model we chose to use the Bullet 
physics engine [16] which was originally designed for fast 3D games. It is nevertheless 
a modern, customizable and open-source update on older engines such as ODE, with 
GPU accelerated collision detection and constraint solving planned for release shortly. 
Custom extensions have been added to Bullet to model the behaviour of the elastic 
muscles, pulleys, gearboxes and motors. 
A first-pass model, shown in Figure 1(b), was produced using the Blender tool to 
create a static 3D model of the robot from extensive measurements, photographs and 
videos. This was exported in sections to Bullet, where joint constraints were then added 
to create a dynamic model, as shown in Figure 1(c). Finally motor attachment points 
and pulleys – or pulley-like behaviour where muscle cables wrap around the shoulder 
or scapula – were added. 
To tune the first-pass model’s dimensions and parameters to match the robot 
sufficiently well is a challenging task, but promising early work uses genetic 
algorithms to search for the best parameter combinations by selecting for the closest 
match between real and simulated proprioceptive signals. 
 
Figure 3. Control architecture using the physics engine to merge environment capture with the robot model 
3.4. Merging the robot and environment to create a simulated ‘inner world’ 
Planning tasks where the robot must move about and interact with objects cannot 
take place without the robot model being situated accurately within the model of the 
environment, and in relation to the modeled target object. A significant attraction of a 
generic physics engine approach is that the simulation can be extended to incorporate 
not just the robot but also a three dimensional model of the environment and the target 
object. Furthermore, using the Kinect sensor and object recognition [14], these models 
can be added selectively as either homogeneous static ‘collision shapes’ (the 
environment, typically a room) or as full dynamic models in their own right – for 
example, a target object such as a bottle that is to be grasped and lifted. Once this is 
achieved this now unified physics-based world model can be used to plan and select the 
best set of activation signals. Figure 3 shows a schematic of this process. The world 
state W(t) is generated by merging the state of the robot model with a static collision 
mesh along with explicit dynamic models of recognized potential target objects. W(t) is 
then stepped forward in the physics engine for a period (din + dout ) before motor 
planning is commenced. 
4. The predicted present 
A range of studies in both cognitive science and neuroscience directly support the 
notion that the state perceived when planning or executing a motor task may not 
correspond to the state captured at the moment of sensory input but rather to an 
estimate of a predicted future state. The flash-lag effect [17], where a moving dot is 
perceived to be ahead of a static one, is a well known simple example, although there 
are competing interpretations. Similarly, the auditory continuity [18] and phonemic 
restoration [19] illusions, where interruptions in sensory data are not perceived at all by 
a subject so long as the data resumes along a predictable path, demonstrate how some 
conscious perceptions appear to derive not from direct data but from a predicted state 
generated some time after a period of data acquisition. 
More interesting still, Ariff et al. [20] found that the position of eye saccades 
tracking an unseen reaching movement appeared to reflect the output of a state 
predictor, rather than the actual position. The saccades correctly predicted the hidden 
hand position until the hand was subjected to a force field, when the eyes at first 
continued to track the predicted path until the saccades were briefly inhibited and a 
corrected estimated position was tracked. Similarly, Fourneret and Jeannerod [21] 
found that subjects performing a motor movement were actually more conscious of the 
relevant stage in their planned movement than in their actual movement, which they 
had been induced to unconsciously distort.  
While this type of evidence emphasizes that what appears to be consciousness of 
state is in fact consciousness of predicted state, there is little satisfactory evidence 
concerning the objective timing of the awareness of the state and the state itself, which 
should be simultaneous to qualify both as dealing with ‘the present’. Conscious 
perception contains many temporal anomalies for which resolution is often sought in 
the idea of retrospectively ‘backdating’ experience to yield a coherent account of 
events, as for example in the cutaneous rabbit illusion [22], where a series of taps on 
the arm appear (wrongly) to the subject to have followed a smooth extrapolated path. 
The best that can be said at the moment is that the apparent, or subjective, present is in 
many cases demonstrably the outcome of a prediction from previous data.  
As noted in Section 1, any representation of the present in an artificial system must 
be a representation of a predicted present; this must also be true of any representation 
of the present in a natural system. Of course, given sufficient computational resources, 
it is certainly possible for a cognitive system, whether artificial or natural, to construct 
a representation of a predicted present, as is routinely done in certain engineering 
systems. However, in our cognitive system there is no requirement for any explicit 
representation of the present; instead, the system contains only data-driven 
representations of the recent past and predicted representations of the near future. If the 
human cognitive system is of the same basic type as that under development for 
ECCEROBOT, in which no representation of the present is required, then the 
application of the representational principle of experience raises the intriguing 
possibility that our own conscious perception, which subjectively appears to be of the 
present, must in fact be either of the near future or the recent past. This hypothesis has 
the potential to account for the existence of at least some of the anomalies mentioned 
above; even if it cannot account for particular anomalies without considerable further 
work, further theoretical and experimental investigation would seem to be worthwhile. 
5. Conclusions 
In both natural and artificial systems, sensory and computational constraints mean that 
any representation of the present must necessarily be a prediction from data gathered in 
the past. In an artificial embodied cognitive system which uses a form of imagination to 
discover and select a beneficial sequence of motor activations, the most important 
representation is of the predicted state of affairs in the near future, and there is no need 
for any representation of the present. Evidence from psychology and neuroscience 
indicates that many apparent perceptions of the present are clearly derived from 
predictions based on past data, but it is not clear whether the predictions refer to states 
in the recent past, the actual present, or the near future. Biologically inspired cognitive 
architectures, especially those dealing with embodied systems in dynamic 
environments, should therefore consider the issue of the representation of the present, 
particularly when dealing with analogues of consciously mediated perception, and 
should take note of the possibility that a representation of the predicted present, while 
technically possible, may be neither necessary nor appropriate. 
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